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JurusmcTION-BAs1s AND RANGE oF PRocEss-REcENT DEVELOP-

MENTS-Since Pennoyer v. Neff-,1 holding that mere notice was an insufficient basis for in personam jurisdiction, it has generally been held
that an in personam judgment requires service, as distinguished from
notice, on a defendant present or domiciled within the jurisdiction.
With the increased tempo of interstate activities, however, it has become expedient to relax the concept of physical power as being the basis
of jurisdiction, which prompted the Pennoyer decision. Presence has
assumed a more elaborate meaning, while service has become more
closely equated with adequate notice. Illustrative of this development
is the recent decision of Traveler's Health Assn. v. Virginia,2 where
peculiar problems were presented relating to a state's ability to regulate
activity carried on substantially beyond its borders, but seriously affecting those within its jurisdiction.
The case involved a Virginia Blue Sky3 statute which required all
those soliciting sales of insurance certificates to obtain permits from the
State Corporation Commission. This entailed their consent to service
through the Secretary of State for suits of Virginia claimants arising
out of the certificates. For failure to obtain such permits, the commission was authorized to obtain an injunction ordering solicitors to
cease and desist. Service for this proceeding was authorized by registered mail where the offering was done from beyond the state borders.
The appellant was incorporated in Nebraska as a membership association in the mail order health insurance business, with its only office

195 U.S. 714 (1877).
2 339 U.S. 643, 70 S.Ct. 927 (1950).
3 Va. Code (Michie, 1950) tit. 8, §13-128 et seq.

882

MicmGAN LAw REVIEW

[ Vol. 49

located in Omaha. It had solicited new members in Virginia since 1904
through the unpaid activities of its older members. For failing to obtain
a permit, it was enjoined from further solicitation; it appealed, contending that jurisdiction for the order was lacking, with a consequent
disregard of due process. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the order, holding that Virginia had sufficient power, consistent with
notions of "fair play and substantial justice," to acquire jurisdiction in
matters regarding solicitation. Moreover, service by registered mail to
the nonresident defendant was constitutional.
In contending that the Virginia court did not have an adequate basis
for jurisdiction, the appellant was primarily concerned with (1) lack of
service on any agent within the state, and (2) insufficient business activity carried on by it in Virginia to constitute a basis on which the state's
power could become operative. By refuting the arguments, the Court
takes an important step in enlarging the range of in personam jurisdiction.

I. Basis of Jurisdiction and Range of Service
A. Range of Service

In regard to the contention of improper service, it is true that the
Court has never before sustained service directly beyond the state's
limits except in the case of domiciliaries. This exception can be traced,
the Court at an early date having recognized the validity of substituted
service upon a domiciliary at his residence within the state.4 Then,
in McDonald v. Mahee,5 Justice Holmes declared that substituted
service against a domiciliary would be supported if it were the most
likely means of informing the defendant. The logical conclusion appeared in Milliken v. Meyer,6 where personal delivery of service against
a domiciliary outside the state was sustained, as "reasonably calculated
to inform."
This development can be contrasted, however, with service upon
non-domiciliaries engaged in activities within the state. The formula was
developed in cases dealing with foreign corporations, where the Court
was unwilling to find domicile of a foreign corporation through business
activity within the state. 7 Jurisdiction was sustained consonant with
4 Early dictum to this effect is found in Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 19 Wall. (86
U.S.) 58 (1873).
li243 U.S. 90, 37 S.Ct. 343 (1917).
6 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339 (1940).
7 This can be contrasted with the English view, finding domicile through business
activity within the jurisdiction. See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Actien-Gesellschaft Co.,
[1902] 1 K.B. 342.
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Pennoyer 11. Nef{-8 through service on its appointed agent present within the state,0 or an agent created by statute in default of this appointment.10 The formula was extended to nonresident motorists,11 and
finally to nonresident individuals doing business within the state.12 In
each case, statutes requiring consent to service through a state agent
were upheld on the basis of the state's power to regulate the activity
concerned. "Presence," in the sense of some activity within state control, supported the state's power to require consent to service through a
resident agent, rather than the state's power to serve an absent defendant directly.
While the Court has indicated in sustaining such service that the
saving factor was the technical limitation on its operative effect to the
state's boundaries,13 recent decisions have indicated the Court's willingness to abandon this artificial restriction. In International Shoe Co. 11.
Washington, the Court said, "due process requires only that ... if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "14
And in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank,1 5 the Court sustained jurisdiction over nonresidents without service within the state, as long as
there was adequate notice, purposefully disregarding any distinction
between in rem and in personam proceedings, insofar as it would be a
possible limitation on the New York court's power in a suit to settle
trust accounts. In the principal case, Justice Black, speaking for the
majority, attaches no importance to the restriction requiring service
through a resident agent, by declaring that what is said in finding
an adequate basis for the state's power in the proceeding answered any
contention of lack of due process. In effect, service is equated with
adequate notice. Justice Minton in writing the dissent shows his cons 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
9 Cases dealing with service on foreign corporations are Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French
Strang and Fine, 18 How. 59 (U.S.) 404 (1855); Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila v. Gold Issue
Min. & Mill. Co., 243 U.S. 93, 37 S.Ct. 344 (1917). See also Smolik v. Phila. and Reading
Coal and hon Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1915) 222 F. 148.
10 See State of Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 53 S.Ct. 624 (1933).
11 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927).
12Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S.Ct. 553 (1935).
18 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 at 355, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927), where the Court
said in supporting service against a nomesident through a state agent, "the process of a court
of one state cannot run into another and summon a party there domiciled•••• Notice sent
outside the state ••• is unavailing.•••" See also Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518
at 521, 15 S.Ct. 559 (1895); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518, 36 S.Ct.
613 (1916):
14 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).
15 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652 (1950).
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cem, however, by holding that "service on an agent within the jurisdiction would seem to me indispensable to a judgment against a corporation."16
B. Basis of Judicial Power
As for the second contention, by holding that mere solicitation
through the activities of unpaid members is sufficient to subject the
appellant to a state's judicial power, the principal decision illustrates
a further expansion in the Court's thinking. The case of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington17 was the foundation for the Court's decision.
Previous authority was to the effect that solicitation in itself would be
insuffic;ient. This is illustrated by Minnesota Assn. v. Benn,1 8 dealing
with a Minnesota association, where unpaid solicitation by members in Montana was held to be insufficient basis for Montana jurisdiction in a suit to recover on the policy. Justice Black dismisses the Benn
case as being decided on narrow grounds, a distinction not readily apparent unless the duration and scope of solicitation in the present case
were held to be appreciably greater. Justice Douglas puts to one side
the case where an individual wishes to bring suit and restrict the present decision to the issue of a state's power to enjoin solicitation. This
distinction would not seem to be helpful, as is pointed out by the dissent, for the state is now enabled to accomplish by indirection what it
formerly could not do directly. The intervening decision of Hoopeston
Canning Co. v. Cullen19 was also determinative, insofar as it found
a basis for state control through considerations of business activity prior
to actual contracting and the degree of state interest in the object to be
insured. Of course, in the Hoopeston case, the Court had available
other elements on which to base state control.2 ° Finally, the majority
was not swayed by the dissent's objections appreciating the distinguishing facts of the International Shoe case, which dealt with solicitation through regular activity of paid agents.
It is difficult to determine what the full effect of the principal de•
cision will be. Several limitations are discernible. Justice Douglas' con16 Principal case at 935.
11 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct.

154 (1945).
ts 261 U.S. 140, 43 S.Ct. 293 (1923). See also Green v. Chicago, Burlington, &
Quincy Ry., 205 U.S. 530, 27 S.Ct. 595 (1907); People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobac·
co Co., 246 U.S. 79, 38 S.Ct. 233.
10 318 U.S. 313, 63 S.Ct. 602 (1943).
20 The case deals with a state's power to condition the insuring of property within its
boundaries by a foreign corporation, by requiring submission to regulations. The power to
regulate was rested on business activity contemplated within the state subsequent to the in·
suring, as well as the initial solicitation.
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cem with the nature of the state action, an injunctive procedure rather
than a suit by a creditor, has already been mentioned. Justice Black
takes cognizance of factors similarly used in the application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, namely the availability of witnesses
in Virginia as to possible claims, and the expense to policy holders of
being required to bring suits on small claims in far off Nebraska. This
is all the more interesting inasmuch as in his separate opinion supporting the International Shoe decision he expressly limited the applicability of notions of fair play, and rested his decision on the constitutional
power of a state to afford judicial protection in the face of business activity within the state irrespective of such "emotional" appeals. 21 In
addition, as was indicated in Hess v. Pawloski22 and Doherty v.
Goodman, 23 the state's power was in some measure conditioned on the
subject matter's being peculiarly subject to the police power, here the
security business. It cannot be said that the Court would not have
found a basis were this characteristic deemed missing; yet it would seem
to be required that the amount of activity within the state be proportionately greater as the state's concern with public welfare decreases. 24 In
this case, protection against unscrupulous solicitation would otherwise
be impossible.

II.

Further Developments

At this point it is interesting to note a recent United States district
court decision. 25 A Maryland statute26 was involved, providing for
service through a resident agent for corporations "doing business" within the state, or for "any cause of action arising out of contract made
within this state or liability incurred for acts done within this state."
Plaintiff brought suit against a foreign corporation in tort for personal
21 International Shoe Co.
22 Hess v. Pawloski, 274

v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 at 325, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).
U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927).
23 Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S.Ct. 553 (1935).
24 Of course, when dealing with jurisdiction over foreign corporations in the face of
substantial activity, the additional factor of the state's power to condition the entry of such
corporations, through the inapplicability of "privilege and immunity" protection which
would be afforded individuals, supplants the necessity of having the subject matter within
the purview of the state's police power. For a development of the various theories regarding jurisdiction, see Scott, "Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State,"
32 HARv. L. REv. 871 at 879 et seq. (1919); Culp, "Process in Actions Against Non-residents Doing Business Within a State," 32 Mi:cH. L. REv. 909 at 919 (1934). It .has been
with unincorporated entities (Doherty v. Goodman, supra note 23; Hess v. Pawloski, supra
note 22) or insubstantial activity within the state (International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
supra note 21) that public interest in the subject matter has been a factor.
25 Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., (D.C. Md. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 654.
20 Md. Code Ann. (Flack 1947) art. 23, §lll.
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injuries resulting from defendant's misrepresentations as to the safety
of the use of machinery manufactured by it. After holding that the
defendant, through mere solicitation for business, could not .be considered as falling within the statute as "doing business" within the
state, the court upheld service under the second clause of the statute
as being constitutional. The facts show that the only activity of the
defendant in Maryland was the sending of the machine into the state,
and the solicitation of a paid agent. Here no activity of general public
concern is involved. In finding a basis for personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, the court points out that solicitation lends support, although
it does not constitute "doing business." The court is also concerned
with the reasonableness of requiring the defendant to defend the suit
in Maryland and the inconvenience wp.ich the plaintiff would otherwise be caused. The decision is commendable and points toward the
position enjoyed by the English courts through statute,27 giving a basis
for personal jurisdiction for any rights arising out of tort or contract perpetrated within the jurisdiction. Professor Sunderland points out in
"The Problem of Jurisdiction" 28 that there is nothing basically wrong
with such a rule, while the Constitution as an original proposition
would not seem to preclude this result.

Thomas Hartwell, S. Ed.

27 Rule

of the Annual Practice of the Supreme Court, order XI, r. 1. p. 87 (1934).

2s 4 Tmc. L. Rnv. 429 (1926).

